. The political status of Kosovo during this period was still an unsolved problem that aroused controversy and caused increased tension between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians. Officially, Kosovo, in accordance with Resolution 144 of the United Nations Security Council that specified the conditions for ending the war in Kosovo in 1999, had broad autonomy while remaining an integral part of the territory of Serbia, but administered by the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 4 . Nowadays, the dispute around the political status of Kosovo still remains unresolved and is a major challenge for Serbia regarding finalising the accession process with the European Union. Moreover, a number of doubts have been raised about the effectiveness of the mechanism of negotiations under the auspices of the EU to normalise the relations between Serbia and Kosovo, which seems to play the role of an indirect measure for resolving the problem of Kosovo's status. It appears that the result of the dialogue brought more new challenges for both Serbia and Kosovo in the regulation of relations between Belgrade and Pristina. Also, some questions regarding the future of Serbian policy in the process of association with the EU were raised by the intensification of Serbian cooperation with Russia in the military field.
The serbs' and kosovo albanians' positions regarding the political status of kosovo
Resolution 144 of the United Nations Security Council, established in 1999, including the arrangements of a solution to the problem of the political status of Kosovo, did not satisfy either the Serbs or Kosovo Albanians 5 . For the Serbs, it indicated that they could lose Kosovo in the future. The Serbs firmly rejected the possibility of such a scenario. Kosovo is considered by them as the cradle of their statehood. Serbs refer to Kosovo as the Serbian Jerusalem because it contains numerous medieval sacred sites. These represent for the Serbs symbols of the creation of the Serbian state, as well as play the role of important elements for defining their national identity. Therefore, Kosovo is perceived by Serbs as a holy place and it is defined by them as the most precious Serbian word .
According to the Kosovo Albanians, Kosovo should be granted independence because of the disintegration of Yugoslavia that started in 1991, when the breakdown of the federation occurred. The conviction of Kosovo Albanians of the rightness for granting Kosovo independence strengthened the authoritarian policies of the Serbian authorities, particularly the experience of political discrimination that took place in the 90's during the reign of President Slobodan Milosevic. In response to the political repression, the Kosovo Albanians created a parallel state -the Republic of Kosovo, manifesting to the international community that they can organise an independently functioning state. From that moment, the independence of Kosovo was perceived by the Kosovo Albanians as the only possible solution to resolve the dispute with the Serbs over the political status of the region 7 . Therefore, the lack of a clear settlement of this problem in Therefore, the lack of a clear settlement of this problem in Resolution 144 of UN Security Council intensified Kosovo Albanians' political frustrations. The final settlement of Kosovo's status was also not determined during the negotiations conducted from 005 under the auspices of the United Nations and led first by Martii Ahtisaari (former President of Finland, Special UN Envoy for the future status process of Kosovo) and next by The Diplomatic Troika (consisted of diplomats of the European Union, United States and Russia) 8 . This This standoff situation was for Kosovo Albanians a strong impulse to declare unilateral independence of Kosovo on 17 February 008 9 .
The decision concerning the proclamation of sovereignty by Kosovo led not only to increased tensions in relations between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians, but made Serbia confront this new challenge in the process of integration with the European Union. The vast majority of the EU countries recognised Kosovo's independence 10 . This situation resulted in strong pressures on the authorities in Belgrade to also accept the Kosovo decision. However, the Serbian government, clinging to maintaining the territorial integrity of the state, was trying to prove the illegality of the Kosovo decision before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Hague. These actions were not successful as the ICJ stated, in its advisory opinion of 3 July 010, that the decision on the declaration of independence of Kosovo is not contrary to the letter of international law
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. The Serbian Parliament, expressing
The Serbian Parliament, expressing their opposition to this opinion, adopted a resolution at an extraordinary meeting, which stated Serbia will never recognise Kosovo as an independent state 1 . Serbian authorities, continuing the protest against the proclamation of sovereignty by Kosovo, made a series of diplomatic efforts aimed at limiting the number of countries recognising Kosovo's independence, and blocking Kosovo's implementation of internal state policies. Moreover, the authorities in Belgrade refused to deal directly with the Republic of Kosovo, agreeing to contacts with Kosovo' Among issues discussed during the negotiations, the problem of determination rules on the movement of goods brought most controversies and tensions. It was invoked by the actions of Serbia, which refused to import goods with Kosovo customs stamps into its territory and banned transit of Kosovo goods through the territory of Serbia. In response to the Belgrade decision, Kosovo's authorities introduced a similar embargo on Serbian goods. In addition, the government in Pristina ordered deployment of special police units on the border with Serbia to enforce the embargo. This decision led to an outbreak of numerous protests and riots organised by Serbs living in northern Kosovo, which were eventually stopped by the intervention of KFOR 18 . The disputed issue of the movement of goods The disputed issue of the movement of goods was finally resolved due to an agreement signed by both Belgrade and Pristina authorities, in which it was stated that the sides will make every possible effort to ensure free movement of goods in accordance with CEFTA. The Customs stamps, stating 'Kosovo Customs' , as . The main objective of this agreement
The main objective of this agreement was to facilitate integration of the Serbian minority living in municipalities in northern Kosovo with the administrative system of Kosovo by creating an Association/Community of Serbian-majority municipalities in Kosovo (called the Association of Serbian Municipalities) and providing certain guarantees for Kosovo Serbs. The Association of Serbian Municipalities had extensive rights in the areas of economic development, education, health, urban and rural planning, and administration structure (President, vice President, Assembly, Council). According to this agreement, all police in northern Kosovo should be integrated in the Kosovo Police framework and the ethnic composition of the local police in the north would reflect the ethnic composition in this area. A Police Regional Commander for the four northern Serbian majority municipalities was appointed, which was to be a Kosovo Serb selected by the Kosovo Ministry of Interior from a list of nominees provided by the mayors of the four Serb municipalities in the north. Likewise, the judicial system was determined to function, which was going to operate under Kosovo' The series of August 015 agreements have been heralded by the EU as a landmark achievement 43 . For the Serbia and Kosovo governments, the biggest challenge was For the Serbia and Kosovo governments, the biggest challenge was implementation of the accord's Association of Serbian Municipalities. Under the deal, the rules of establishment of the Association, a particularly defined legal framework, organisational structure, relations with central authorities, legal capacity, budget and financial support were laid down. Also, it was set out that areas of activities conducted by Kosovo Serbs may be financed by Serbian authorities. The Association will have its own institutions and will be entitled to have its own official symbols (coat of arms and flag), in accordance with Kosovo law 44 .
Kosovo's opposition was strongly against adoption of this agreement by the parliament. In their view, the accord was giving too much freedom to the Serbian minority depriving the Kosovo authorities of control over the areas inhabited by the Serbian minority and preventing efficient management of the state. The opposition claimed that implementing this agreement could lead Serbia to obtaining control over Kosovo's internal policy. Therefore, their representatives, in order to prevent adoption of the accord, repeatedly paralysed the work of the parliament by firing tear gas. Also, at the opposition's request, the agreement was contested by the Kosovo Constitutional Court, which found that some of the regulations are inconsistent with the Kosovo constitution. Moreover, many Kosovo Albanians were against adoption of this accord, who organised a series of demonstrations in which they often expressed support for the opposition stance 45 .
Nevertheless, the ending of this dispute and constructive implementation of agreement is awaited by the Serbian minority in Kosovo. They expect that establishment of the Association will stabilise and normalise their life, give them Kosovo and Serbia sign 'landmark' agreements, http a sense of security, both economic and personal, and lead them to preserve their national identity. Currently, the Serbian minority is in an ambiguous situation because Serbian state institutions representing them have been dissolved by the Brussels Agreement and no useful counterparts have been established in their place. Besides, Kosovo's institutions are not prepared yet for the integration of Serbs into society in the way that allows them to preserve their national identity 46 . In order to resolve this problem, Serbian and Kosovo authorities need to start effective cooperation of implementing legal acts. Prolonging the dispute over the Association's establishment will cause a slow movement downwards to undermining the other, already adopted agreements. Furthermore, this situation could generate tensions between the Serbs and Kosovo Albanians and lead to civilian unrest. A significant impact on the advancement in relations between Serbia and Kosovo could also come from the lack of a clear interpretation by the Serbs and Kosovo's government of the arrangements for personal ID-cards. The debate about this issue started at a time when Kosovo's authorities decided to close the border to residents of Kosovo who used Serbian parallel structures' ID-cards 47 . The decision The decision sparked a series of protests of the Serbian minority in Kosovo. After difficult negotiations mediated by European Union representatives, delegations from Belgrade and Pristina worked out a solution for monitoring traffic on the SerbianKosovo border. However, both parties presented the outcome of this agreement in differing ways, which raised some doubts about how it could be implemented. Kosovo . In the opinion of the Director of the Office for Kosovo and In the opinion of the Director of the Office for Kosovo and Metohija in the Serbian government, Marko Durić, this project is a historic step that will enable the return of Serbs to Kosovo, particularly Serbs who had to leave the region after the end of the war in Kosovo in 1999. On the other hand, the Prime Minister of Kosovo, Isa Mustafa, argues that the project does not have legal permits to be carried out; therefore, the already started construction of settlement will not be allowed to continue. Some of the Albanian media in Kosovo have also strongly objected to building housing for Serbs, and have described the move as a neo-colonial attempt by Belgrade to consolidate its influence over the Serbian minority in north Kosovo 54 .
The EU expectations versus the serbia position
The European Union does not formally ask Serbia to recognise Kosovo but urges Serbia to normalise relations with Kosovo through implementing already accepted bilateral agreements and engaging in reaching further agreements leading gradually to the comprehensive normalisation in relations between Belgrade and Pristina. In a report on the common position on Chapter 35, the EU stated that Serbia should ensure completing work on implementation of the 5 August 015 agreements, particularly on the establishment of the Association/Community of Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo and 
process of European integrations

58
. At the same time, Belgrade emphasises that progress has been reached in implementation of the agreement on the bridge over the Ibar River and the "Peace Park", the Agreement on Civil Protection. Also, there is ongoing dialogue on energy and telecommunications issues. However, there has been no substantial improvement in negotiation between Serbian and Kosovo officials regarding the formation of the Association of Serbian Municipalities provided for by the First Agreement, mainly because the Kosovo authorities kept trying to evade the implementation of the first six points of the First Agreement relating to the formation and role of the Association of Serbian Municipalities 59 .
Reaching progress with Pristina in this area is one of main concerns for the Serbian government. In the opinion of the Director of Office for Kosovo and Serbia has a fallback strategy, which he calls the three Ds. -delay, division and distraction. It is possible to use this when some of the factors appear: the first one -when proposal of maximum autonomy for Kosovo Albanians may not succeed, and the second one: Russia will not hold forever to vetoing every Security Council Resolution that offers independence to Kosovo. Applying this strategy will enable Serbia to solidify control over the north municipalities in Kosovo as well as several Serbian enclaves and also to present the international community with the fact of partition 65 . However, it also creates the possibility of pushing Serbia However, it also creates the possibility of pushing Serbia away from accession to the European Union and from normalising its relations with Kosovo.
Russia's influence on serbia's integration with the EU
Russia is a key political ally for Serbia because it does not recognise Kosovo's independence. It is also its important economic partner as the third-largest source of imports and fourth-largest destination for exports. Serbia is heavily dependent on Russian natural gas. In 008, it agreed with Moscow that the $50bn South Stream pipeline would cross its territory, and in turn sold a controlling stake in its national oil and gas company NIS to �azprom 66 .
On 17 May 016, both parties signed an agreement on military cooperation which included purchasing new equipment for the Serbian army from Russia, and upgrading the Russian arms previously purchased by the Serbs. According to this agreement, there will be a centre for repair and maintenance of helicopters produced in Russia established in Belgrade and there will be a production line . The centre was formed in 011 and, because of its The centre was formed in 011 and, because of its strategic location, can be seen as an outpost of the Russian military presence in the region 68 .
Strengthened Serbian relations with Russia in the fields of military cooperation causes great concern for the European Union. Brussels perceives this step as an ambiguous signal sent by Serbia to Europe regarding the further development of pro-integration reforms and policy. The concern of the EU accentuates the fact that Serbia did not agree to impose sanctions on Russia in response to President Putin's aggressive policy towards Ukraine. All these circumstances may result in Belgrade losing its credibility as a stable partner for the EU, which certainly can affect the advancement of the process of Serbia's accession to the EU. Serbian Prime Minister, Aleksandar Vučić, in order to dispel the concerns of the West, assured that the purchase of Russian weapons is not related to the reinforcement of Serbia, but is intended to ensure security in the face of the reinforcement of Croatia by NATO
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. Despite this, the West discerns a potential threat to the security of the Balkans region in closer ties between Serbia and Russia.
Moreover, the present Serbia-Russia cooperation indicates that the Serbian government could change its geopolitical strategy and move away from its proWestern policy and turn towards a further strengthening of political relationships with Moscow
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. This may happen in a situation when the accession conditions set out by the European Union will be too harsh, namely when the EU will increase pressure on the Serbian authorities to accept Kosovo's independence. Also, Belgrade's decision to choose the pro-Eastern direction in politics may play a role in Russian policy in the Balkans. In Russia's view, Serbia's geopolitical position has a strong effect on stabilisation of the Western Balkans. Serbia is one of the biggest countries in the region, and it is a neighbour of states with large Serb minorities such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro. Therefore, Russia will keep close relations with Serbia because in this way it can maintain its influence in the Balkans. This region is, for Moscow, the area to compete with other political actors e.g. the US and the EU. And by having a dominant or significant position here, Russia is allowed to control routes of energy supplies to Europe 71 .
However, the present and highly controversial position of Russia in the international community brings up a reflection that Serbia should find some other strategic ally which will advocate on the EU forum for it and give support to speeding up Serbia's accession process to the EU. Polish authorities have frequently expressed acknowledgment for Serbia's political reforms. Also, Poland is continuing its endorsement during the ongoing Polish Presidency in the European Union 7 . In In view of the Prime Minister, Alexander Vučić, Serbia can take advantage of the Polish experience in the accession process to the EU, especially in the field of economy and foreign investment 73 .
Conclusions
Serbia faces a major challenge -solving the problem of the future political status of Kosovo on the way to becoming a member of the European Union. Serbia does not recognise the proclaimed independence of Kosovo and Albanians see Kosovo as a sovereign state, which is autonomously functioning in the international arena. Therefore, in their view, Serbia should recognise Kosovo's independence. The European Union expects that the ongoing dispute will be resolved during negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo conducted under the auspices of the EU representatives. The main aim of the dialogue is normalisation of bilateral relations. The EU makes granting Serbia's EU membership conditional on its fulfillment of obligations regarding regulation of relations with Pristina.
The conducted Serbia-Kosovo dialogue on the one hand brought some positive changes in the normalisation of bilateral relations, but on the other hand created some new challenges. The complex nature of the emerging problems may cause Serbia delays on the way to its accession to the EU. Among those issues which provoke strong political and ethical tensions are the establishment of the Association of Serbian Municipalities, the recognition of ID-cards by Kosovo's Serb minority and construction of settlements for Serbs returning to northern Kosovo and Metohija. All of the challenges create a specific model system, which can be named as a system of strategic challenges for state integration with the EU. The structure of the system has a construction like the pyramid. On the bottom of the pyramid, on the first level, the main challenge is located, which for Serbia has been the unresolved political status of Kosovo. On the next -second level -there are new problems, which in Serbia's case has been the issue emanating from negotiations conducted under the auspices of the EU representatives. The final level of the structure generates a general challenge for the state policy, which is obtaining EU membership. The main instrument used to resolve all the challenges is a mechanism of negotiation under the auspicious of the EU representatives. An impact on the progress in solving the issues and at the same time accelerating the state integration with the EU may have some influence on external factors, namely one or more political actors. This may substantially shape the state policy regarding continuation of the process of bilateral negotiations as well as future integration with the EU. In the case of Serbia, the role of influential actor is played by Russia. The recently noticed strengthened cooperation between Serbia and Russia, particularly in the military fields, may lead to withdrawal of Serbia from the future development of the pro-European Union policy and turning towards consolidating its pro-East and pro-Russia partnership. It is possible that this scenario can happen when the EU keeps up pressure on Serbia to resolve the issue of the future status of Kosovo, which practically means forcing Serbia to accept Kosovo's independence. In this situation, the EU actions can be seen by Serbia as a threat for state security. On the other hand, Russia has been seen by Serbia as a long term strategic partner. Moscow supports Serbian stands regarding Kosovo's political status as well as strongly cooperating with Belgrade in the field of energy security.
The complexity and difficulties of the challenges Serbia meets in the integration process with the European Union lead to conclusion that more time is required to resolve these problems. Nevertheless, choosing this option may cause delays in completing Serbia's accession negotiations with the EU. And for Belgrade, losing the prospect of obtaining EU membership in the near future could fuel nationalist sentiments and lead to a new conflict in the region. A potential way that could accelerate Serbia's integration process is renegotiation with the European Union on the conditions regarding Chapter 35 on normalisation of relations with Kosovo. 
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